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Are Regulations Exempting Certain
Home Health Care Attendants from
Wage and Hour Laws Enforceable?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 382-386. © 2007 American Bar Association.

applied to her employment.
However, she contended that the
regulation was unreasonable and
impermissible in light of the FLSA's
clear language and statutory purpose. The district court found the
Department of Labor regulation was
entitled to strong deference under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Pointing to the
explicit statutory grant of authority
to the Department of Labor to
define and delimit Section
213(a)(15) of the FLSA, the district
court held that § 552.109(a) was a
legitimate exercise of the
Department of Labor's authority,
and the court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Coke v. Long Island Care
at Home Care, Ltd., 267 F.Supp.2d
332 (S.D.N.Y 2003).

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of
Law at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Professor Grenig is a co-author of
West's FederalJury Practiceand
Instructions. He can be reached
at jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (414) 288-5377.

ISSUE
Does a Department of Labor
regulation exempt from the minimum wage and overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act
employees who care for the elderly
or infirm and who are employed
by an employer or agency other
than the family or household using
their services?

On appeal, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court. The
court of appeals reasoned that the
FLSA is a remedial act, and its
exemptions are to be narrowly construed. Pointing out that the
Department of Labor had included

FACTS
Evelyn Coke filed an action in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. She alleged
that she had been employed by the
defendants as a "home health care
attendant" since 1997. Coke
claimed that the defendants did not
pay her minimum wage or overtime
compensation, although she was
working more than forty hours
per week.

LONG IsLAND CARE AT HOME,
LTD., AND OSBORNE V. COKE

DOCKET No. 06-593
Coke acknowledged that the "companionship services" exemption to
the FLSA, as interpreted and
defined by a Department of Labor
regulation (29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a))
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§ 552.109(a) under a part titled
"Interpretations," the court refused
to accord Chevron deference to
§ 552.109(a), deeming it to be an
interpretive rather than a legislative
regulation.
The court of appeals also declined
to give deference to § 552.109(a)
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944). Concluding that
persons employed by a third party
were outside the category of domestic service employees and were protected by the FLSA Act before the
1974 amendments, the court of
appeals said "[i]t is implausible, to
say the least, that Congress, in
wishing to expand FLSA coverage,
would have wanted the DOL to
eliminate coverage for employees of
third party employers who had previously been covered." The court of
appeals also placed considerable
weight on what it characterized as a
"stark internal inconsistency"
between § 552.3 (the regulation
defining "domestic service employment") and § 552.109(a), finding
that, under § 552.3, employees
employed by third parties do not
qualify for the exemption that
§ 552.109(a) grants them. The court
of appeals pointed to the fact that
the Department of Labor had proposed eliminating the exemption for
third-party employees on several
occasions, deeming the Department
of Labor's position "hardly ... a
model of consistency." The court
questioned both the Department of
Labor's reasoning and procedural
regularity in adopting § 552.109(a).
The court of appeals concluded the
Department of Labor regulation
applying the "companionship services" exemption to services rendered by persons employed by
third parties, as opposed to the
family of the recipient of care, was
unenforceable.
The Supreme Court granted the
defendants' petition for review. It
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noted that the Department of Labor
had recently issued a memorandum
asserting that it had intended
§ 552.109(a) "to be an exercise of
its expressly delegated authority." In
the memorandum, the Department
Labor had asserted that, by reading
§ 552.3 and § 552.101(a) as requiring that domestic service employment be performed in private
homes but as not addressing the
issue of third-party employment,
regulations are fully harmonized
and rendered internally consistent.
The memorandum went on to state:
Consequently the Department
reads sections 552.3 and
552.101(a) as not addressing the
issue of third party employment.
Read in that context, I find no
inconsistency between sections
552.3 and 552.109(a). All prior
statements by the Department to
the contrary, including the
Department's January 19, 2001
NPRM, see 66 Fed. Reg. at 5485,
are hereby repudiated and
withdrawn.
The Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to
the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of the Department
of Labor's memorandum.
On remand, the Second Circuit
again determined that the regulation
applying the "companionship services" was unenforceable. It also
concluded that the arguments presented in the Department of Labor
memorandum were unpersuasive.
The court of appeals continued to
rely on the purported incompatibility between § 552.109(a) and
§ 552.3 and concluded § 552.109(a)
was unenforceable. Coke v. Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd., 462 F.3d
48 (2d Cir. 2006).
The defendants again petitioned the
Supreme Court to review the
Second Circuit's decision. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari
on January 5, 2007.

CASE ANALYSIS
This case presents the narrow, but
important, question of what deference should be given to Department
of Labor regulations concerning the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The
FLSA, enacted by Congress in 1938,
requires employers to pay most
workers a specified minimum wage
and overtime compensation for
hours worked in excess of forty per
week. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
Before 1974, home care aides were
generally covered by minimum wage
and overtime laws if they were
employed by agencies. Aides hired
directly by families were not covered. In 1974, Congress amended
the FLSA to broaden its coverage to
include employees performing
"domestic services "-including
household workers such as maids
and cooks. The 1974 legislation
carved out exceptions for employees
engaged in "babysitting services"
and "companionship services." 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(15).
Soon after the 1974 amendments,
the Department of Labor promulgated a series of regulations more
clearly delineating who are subject
to the exemption. One of the regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 552.6, includes
within the exemption: (1) those who
perform household work related to
the care of the elderly or infirm,
and (2) those who also perform
housework incidental to their "companionship services" as long as the
housework accounts for less than
twenty percent of the weekly hours
worked. A second regulation (29
C.F.R. § 552.109(a)) applies the
exemption to employees engaged
in providing companionship services, as defined in § 552.6, and
who are employed by an employer
or agency other than the family or
household using their services. Only
§ 552.109(a) is at issue in the proceeding before the Supreme Court.
(Continued on Page 384)

Although the Department of Labor
called § 552.109(a) an "interpretation," it was promulgated following
the statutory notice and comment
procedures for legislative regulations. However, the rule the
Department of Labor adopted after
comments were received was the
opposite of the rule proposed in the
original notice.

statute by the administering agency
is entitled to great weight. See Leary
v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
To apply Chevron, a court must
determine "whether the statute
unambiguously forbids the
[aigency's interpretation, and, if not,
whether the interpretation, for other
reasons exceeds the bounds of the
permissible." Barnhartv. Walton,

535 U.S. 212 (2002).
In early 2001, the Clinton administration in its next-to-last day in
office proposed amendments to the
"companionship services" exemption regulations. According to a
statement by the Department of
Labor, it proposed to amend the regulations to revise the definition of
"companionship services" to "more
closely mirror Congressional intent."
The Department of Labor explained
that in 1974 it was Congress's intent
"to cover all workers who performed
domestic services as a vocation,
excluding casual babysitters and
providers of companionship services
who were not regular bread winners
or responsible for their [own] families support." In 2002, the Bush
administration scrapped the proposed amendments.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), provides that
an administrative agency charged
with implementing a federal statute
has authority to make rules to fill
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly.
According to Chevron, when
Congress has delegated rulemaking
authority to an administrative
agency, a federal court must recognize that Congress intended any
statutory ambiguity to be "resolved,
first and foremost, by the [administrative] agency." A federal court may
not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrative agency. The courts
also recognize that a long-standing
contemporaneous construction of a

However, not all administrative
agency actions merit Chevron deference. Administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the administrative agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that
the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority. United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001). According to Mead, interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines may merit
some deference even though the
interpretation is not entitled to
Chevron deference.
Long Island Care asserts there is no
real dispute that Congress delegated
authority to the Department of
Labor to make regulations "carrying
the force of law." According to Long
Island Care, in establishing an
exemption for workers who provide
"companionship services (29 U.S.C.
§ 213(a)(15)), Congress expressly
declared that the terms of the
exemption provision should be
"defined and delimited by regulations of the Secretary [of Labor]."
Long Island Care also notes that
Congress set forth a general grant of
rule-making power, saying the
Secretary of Labor was authorized
to prescribe necessary rules, regulations, and orders with respect to
amendments to the FLSA.

Disagreeing with Long Island Care,
Coke asks the Court to affirm the
Second Circuit without deciding
whether the third-party regulation is
entitled to Chevron deference
because it says § 552.10(a) is contrary to the language of the FLSA
"companionship exemption" (29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(15), contrary to
congressional intent, and contrary
to another Department of Labor regulation (29 C.F.R. § 552.3). She
claims the Second Circuit's construction of the regulation as not
stripping employees of third-party
business firms of the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime protections
is the only one that gives meaning
to all the words in the statutory
exemption, is consistent with congressional intent, and is consistent
with the Department of Labor's own
definition in § 552.3 of the term
"domestic service employment."
Coke argues the Department of
Labor expressly and intentionally
did not adopt the regulation pursuant to its delegated authority to
adopt rules "carrying the force of
law." She points out that the
Department of Labor stated in its
regulations (29 C.F.R. § 552.2(c)),
as well as in the notice of proposed
rule making, that the third-party
regulation was not among those that
"defined and delimited" the statutory terms but rather was a "statement of policy and interpretation."
Coke asserts that the Department of
Labor's attempt retroactively to
reclassify the regulation should be
accorded little weight in relation to
the express, contemporaneous classification and is unpersuasive.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (2001), provides a more limited
level of deference to be used where
an interpretive regulation clarifies
ambiguous terms found in a statute
or explains how a provision operates. While interpretive regulations
may sometimes function as prece-
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dents, they are not entitled to
Chevron deference as a class.
Interpretive regulations are
nonetheless afforded "considerable
weight" and will be upheld if they
implement the congressional mandate in a reasonable manner.
Skidmore provides for deference
based upon a regulation's "power to
persuade" given the agency's claim
to expertise under the statute.
Because it believes the regulation
was not adopted pursuant to the
Department of Labor's authority to
adopt rules "carrying the force of
law," and because it is an interpretive regulation, Coke asserts the deference due is that under Skidmore.
Coke says that, under Skidmore,
the Second Circuit properly
declined to follow the regulation
because the regulation is inconsistent with the statutory exemption's
text, congressional intent, the
Department of Labor's own definition of "domestic service employment," the regulation governing
babysitters, and the Supreme
Court's mandate that the
Department of Labor narrowly construe the FLSA's exemptions.
Long Island Care contends there is
nothing in the 1974 amendments to
the FLSA requiring that "employed
in domestic service" indicates an
intention to exempt only workers
employed by the homeowner. Long
Island Care emphasizes that 29
U.S.C. § 206(f), the provision covering employees in domestic service,
speaks of workers "employed in
domestic service in a household,"
not of workers employed "by the
household." (Italics in original)
Long Island Care also notes that the
overtime provision in 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(1) refers only to employment
"in"a household.
Coke says the language of 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(13) exempting employees
"employed in domestic service

employment to provide companionship" encompasses only companions
employed directly by private
household employers. It is Coke's
position that the 1974 amendments
extended the FLSA to all employees
''employed in domestic service,"
but exempted only employees
''employed in domestic service
employment" to provide babysitting
or companionship services. (Italics
in original) Coke asserts there is
a material distinction between
the terms "domestic service" and
"domestic service employment."
She says the former term is broader,
encompassing domestic work performed in a household irrespective
of the identity of the employer
while the latter term is narrower,
additionally requiring an employment relationship between the
domestic employee and the private
household. Coke claims the thirdparty regulation ignores the significance of the word "employment" as
distinct from the word "service,"
rendering the word "employment"
superfluous.
According to Long Island Care, the
rule-making history demonstrates
that the Department of Labor promulgated the third-party employer
regulation after full notice-and-comment rule making-a procedure
required only for rules of a legislative nature. Long Island Care also
relies on the Department of Labor's
statement in the 2005 memorandum claiming that the Department
intended the regulation to be binding at the time of promulgation and
has always treated it that way.
With respect to the contention that
there is an irreconcilable conflict
between § 552.109(a) and § 552.3 of
the regulations, Long Island Care
argues that the Department of
Labor's explanation as to why there
is not a conflict should be given deference. According to Long Island
Care, the very existence of a con-

flict between two regulations indicates some kind of ambiguity, and
the Department of Labor has provided a reasonable way of resolving
the ambiguity.
Declaring that the third-party
employer regulation has governed
whether companions are entitled to
minimum wages and overtime pay
for more than 30 years, Long Island
Care says that, when the
Department of Labor proposed eliminating the third-party employer
exemption several years ago, it
withdrew the proposal, after notice
and comment, because of a concern
about potential adverse effects. Long
Island Care says those potential
effects remain today, and if contrary
policy arguments have any basis, it
is Congress and the Department of
Labor that should address them.
Coke argues that the court
should not accord deference to a
regulation that the Department of
Labor itself calls "interpretations."
According to Coke, Mead requires
the courts to apply a lesser degree
of deference to § 552.109(a) as an
interpretive rather than a legislative
regulation. Coke argues that under
Skidmore's less deferential standard
§ 552.109(a) is unenforceable. She
contends the regulation is inconsistent with Congress's likely purpose
in enacting the 1974 amendments,
inconsistent with other regulations,
and inconsistent with other agency
positions over time.
Recognizing that several Senate
and House reports describe the
"generally accepted meaning" of
"domestic service" as referring to
work "in or about a private home of
the person by whom [the worker] is
employed," Long Island Care claims
those references to not reveal a
plain, or even likely, intent to
limit the 1974 amendment to
homeowner-employed workers.
(Continued on Page 386)
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Long Island Care notes that the
House and Senate Reports also treat
the term "domestic service employees" as essentially synonymous with
the term "private household workers"-a term that includes employees of third parties-indicating that
members of Congress using the
terms were thinking about the place
of work and not about the employer.
Coke argues that the legislative context in which Congress adopted the
companionship exemption also illuminates its meaning, confirming
congressional intent to exempt only
companions employed directly by
private households. She points out
that for over a decade prior to the
1974 amendments, the FLSA covered companions and other domestics employed by third-party firms
qualifying as enterprises engaged in
commerce. Coke indicates that
throughout congressional discussions of the amendments the committees and individual members of
Congress repeatedly stated that they
intended to expand the FLSA's coverage of domestics; nowhere,
according to Coke, did Congress
express any intent to contract existing language.
According to Coke, the only concerns expressed in Congress about
the extension of the act's coverage
of domestics related exclusively to
domestics employed directly by private households. In response to
these expressed concerns for private-household employers, Coke
states that Congress created a limited set of special provisions applicable only to employees employed by
households, including the companionship exemption, as it had earlier
done in the Social Security Act.
Addressing the House and Senate
Reports, Coke says that they
explained that household employers
could be accommodated through
the companionship exemption (and
the paired exemption of babysitters)

because Congress did not expect
provision of companionship or
babysitting to be a regular source of
support for companions employed
by households.
SIGNIFICANCE
Applying the Chevron deference
test, in Johnston v. Volunteers of
America, 13 F.3d 559 (10th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072,
121 S.Ct. 763, 148 L.Ed.2d 665
(2001), the Tenth Circuit has found
the companionship services exemption to be valid on its face. However,
the Tenth Circuit held that employees who were not directly employed
by clients were not exempt from
overtime requirements pursuant to
companion services exemption
when the care was provided in residences that had been selected by
the employer and found not to be
private homes. Also applying
Chevron, the Ninth Circuit has
ruled that attendants performing
"companionship services" in clients'
private homes are excluded by the
companionship services exemption
from minimum wage coverage.
McCune v. Oregon Sr. Services
Div., 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990).
This case provides the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to clarify when the Chevron deference test
should be applied.
This controversy reflects the tension between the goal of providing
workers with living wages and the
goal of providing necessary and
affordable services at an affordable
cost. Some suggest that a victory for
the respondent will result in higher
wages, inducing more workers to
provide companionship services.
Others suggest that a ruling in favor
of the respondent will make companionship services less affordable.
They claim that the need to restrain
costs in the case of third-party
employees has only become more
acute as agencies provide an
increasing amount of needed care.
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